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Abstract 
In philosophical and psychological literature, gratitude has normally been promoted as 
beneficial to oneself and others and as morally good. Being grateful for what you have is 
conceived as virtuous, while acts expressing gratefulness to those who have benefited you is often 
regarded as morally praiseworthy, if not morally expected. However, critical interrogations of 
the moral status of gratitude should also frame the possible cultivation of gratitude in moral 
education. This essay focuses on whether gratitude should be regarded as morally ideal, 
praiseworthy, or expected in contexts marked by social inequity and injustice. It considers 
competing articulations of gratitude in philosophical and psychological research and how 
gratitude can be conceived in some cases as praiseworthy and in others as potentially 
problematic. Finally it considers the implications of a multipronged view of gratitude for 
teaching for and about gratitude in social justice education. 
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In philosophical and psychological literature, gratitude is normally promoted as beneficial 
to oneself and others and as morally good (e.g., Emmons & Crumpler, 2000; Emmons & Shelton, 
2002; Fitzgerald, 1998; Berger, 1975; Card, 1988). Being thankful for what you have is 
conceived as virtuous, while acts expressing gratefulness to those who have benefited you is often 
regarded as morally praiseworthy, if not morally expected (Gulliford, Morgan & Kristjansson, 
2013; McConnell, 1993). In relation, it is becoming commonplace today, particularly in the 
United States, to embrace practices of gratitude developed through positive psychology (for 
example, writing in gratitude journals), as means toward becoming a better, happier person, 
individually and socially (see Emmons & McCullough, 2003; Froh, Sefick, & Emmons, 2008; 
Carr, Morgan & Gulliford, 2015). Against this backdrop, only recently have some theorists (Carr, 
2013; 2015a) begun to critically interrogate the highly diverse philosophical and psychological 
conceptualizations of and justifications for gratitude with regard to their educational implications. 
As Carr rightly observes, before moral educators promote gratitude in their classrooms, they 
should develop a clearer view of what constitutes moral gratitude, alongside consideration of 
possible immoral forms of gratitude (2015b; see also Carr, Morgan & Gulliford, 2015). 
Additionally, contexts marked by social imbalances and social injustice have not been a focus in 
the literature on gratitude, which has tended to justify rather than problematize gratitude, overall.  
This essay focuses on whether gratitude should be regarded as morally neutral, ideal, 
praiseworthy, required, or expected, with an emphasis on contexts of social inequity and injustice. 
First, I sketch some of the terrain of philosophical articulations of when and why one should 
demonstrate gratitude, focusing on situations of inequality. I follow McAleer (2012) in 
distinguishing two philosophical conceptions of gratitude, ‘targeted’ and ‘propositional’, and 
relate them to justifications for gratitude from psychological literature (e.g., Lambert, Graham & 
Fincham, 2009). Then I challenge the moral status, particularly of propositional gratitude, which 
some also describe as generalized ‘appreciation’ (Manela, 2016; Adler & Fagley, 2005), in 
situations of harm and injustice. I discuss how gratitude can be conceived in some cases (as 
targeted gratitude) as generally morally ideal and praiseworthy and in others (as 
propositional/generalized gratitude or appreciation) as potentially morally problematic, despite 
possible psychological benefits of gratitude. Finally I consider the implications of this 
multipronged view for teaching for and about gratitude. I argue that while teaching gratitude in 
the classroom may generally be a good idea, as there are cases where gratitude may be morally 
undesirable teachers should be more precise in teaching for and about gratitude. 
 
Gratitude, Gratitude, Everywhere 
 At the most general level, gratitude is chiefly praised as an individual’s favorable, 
thankful response (as a state of being or type of behavior) to receiving something desirable, 
necessary, and/or beneficial, as a free gift rather than an object of exchange. As Fitzgerald notes 
(1998, p. 120), it is a sense of appreciation and goodwill, and a related disposition to act 
positively in response to someone or something. However from this general view, there are 
‘stricter’ and ‘broader’ accounts of when gratitude may be morally expected, praiseworthy, or 
required (Gulliford, Morgan & Kristjansson, 2013). In philosophy McAleer (2012) distinguishes 
the major views of gratitude as ‘targeted’ and ‘propositional’. This categorization interrelates 
substantially within those in psychological research, such as Lambert and colleagues’ (2009) 
finding that lay people view gratitude as ‘benefit-targeted’ and ‘generalized’.  
Card elaborates a well-known stricter or targeted view, claiming gratitude may be morally 
expected and praiseworthy when (1) one receives something good, (2) that he or she wanted, (3) 
from a benefactor. In this case, gratitude is described as targeted by McAleer (and benefit-
targeted in Lambert, Graham & Fincham, 2009), because there is a benefactor (target) in the 
situation, who possesses agency and intentionality, aiming to do something both benefactor and 
beneficiary see as good (2012, p. 55). Such a situation Card among others distinguishes from 
general (acts of) generosity, not specifically intended by the benefactor to the beneficiary, or 
desired by the beneficiary in the situation. As Card writes of this case (1988, p. 124), ‘generosity 
can be accompanied by insensitivity to others wishes’ with regard to becoming 
obligated…Genuine benevolence is incompatible with disregarding others’ willingness to be 
obligated’.  
 Such targeted gratitude is, McAleer notes, often regarded as morally ideal or praiseworthy, 
as it aligns with ethical and political principles that one should act reciprocally toward others and 
reinforce beneficence (2012, p. 58). One could say there is a moral duty or debt of gratitude in 
this case; however, most contemporary philosophers contend that gratitude’s affective component 
disqualifies it from the realm of moral obligation (Fitzgerald, 1998, p. 120; Card, 1988, p. 117; 
Gulliford, Morgan & Kristjansson, 2013), while others hold this ‘debt’ as paradoxical in relation 
to the notion of a gift (Carr, 2015a; Card, 1988). Nonetheless, targeted gratitude is relatively 
uncontroversial when regarded as morally ideal or praiseworthy, rather than required or expected. 
I do not contest it here, apart from noting that there may be cross-cultural differences regarding 
particular communicative and interpersonal norms of benevolence and gratitude, and that in some 
instances gratitude may conflict with other moral principles, such as justice or non-maleficence 
(for instance, if one is grateful for corruptions that benefit oneself; Carr, Morgan & Gulliford, 
2015). Targeted gratitude should not be held as always morally ideal or required, if it may 
generally be expected or praiseworthy.  
A broader potential view of a kind of quasi-targeted gratitude is elaborated by Smilansky 
(1997). He argues that you should be grateful for people not harming you, broadening the 
cateogry of intentional beneficence to include intentional non-maleficence. Non-maleficence, 
Smilansky contends, requires effort, at least a choice made to not harm, as one has opportunities 
and selfish reasons to ignore others’ ends. In other words: 
‘not harming regularly requires concern and effort, and is clearly beneficial to people. To 
be ungrateful for such beneficial efforts is often not different in kind from ingratitude 
toward our (positive) beneficiaries, one of the most morally distasteful and socially 
harmful traits.’ (1997, p. 593)  
According to this way of thinking, I should be grateful you are reading this paper rather than 
plotting how to steal my money. Smilansky attests that one benefit to this model is to give greater, 
more equal moral standing to disadvantaged members of society, who cannot afford displays of 
good-doing yet deserve equal recognition as moral agents in society (1997, p. 597). However, 
with this move he also observes that this gratitude, although targeted to agents, is targeted to ‘a 
multitude of unknown people’, in a kind of double-blind moral ‘social bargain’, founded on 
greater general awareness (1997, p. 596).   
Yet once the target or agent of gratitude becomes generalized, McAleer distinguishes 
such gratitude as propositional rather than targeted, as an agentic or intentional benefactor is not 
required: only that there is something good. (Carr discusses this as dyadic rather than triadic 
gratitude [2015b].)  As the target is not identified or specified, there is no sense of reciprocity or 
obligation here. Rather, a more basic or thin disposition of thankfulness is morally praiseworthy, 
from this view. In psychological research, propositional gratitude, described as ‘generalized 
gratitude’ by Lambert, Graham, and Fincham (2009), is often adopted, as it can be seen to reflect 
lay people’s views, although this remains a controversial point in both philosophical and 
psychological literature, with some arguing that appreciation is a sub-factor of lay conceptions of 
gratitude, and others contending that it should be seen as separate and isolated from targeted 
gratitude (Mandela, 2016; Gulliford, Morgan & Kristjansson, 2013). Nonetheless, propositional 
gratitude, appreciation, or generalized gratitude remains worth examining from the viewpoint of 
social justice education, as it is linked to self-esteem, well-being, and prosocial attitudes and 
behavior (Froh et al., 2014; Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; Algoe, 2012).  
As an alternative to Smilansky’s quasi-targeted gratitude, where one is grateful to many 
intentional (in non-maleficence), yet possibly unknown others, Card argues that one can be 
grateful for a generous benefactor’s acts or existence that benefits oneself, without having or 
expressing gratitude toward the benefactor directly (see also Manela, 2016). Targeted gratitude to 
generous benefactors can be accompanied by a sense of indebtedness and guilt, shame, and 
embarrassment (Card, 1988; Carr, 2015a; Morgan, Gulliford, & Carr, 2015; Morgan, Gulliford & 
Kristjansson, 2014). Such may be difficult to bear in contexts of extreme inequality, such as 
between a wealthy individual and a person living in poverty. A sense of subservience can have 
harmful implications for one’s sense of self-respect. Hence, propositional gratitude is typically 
not seen to involve behaviors or interpersonal expressions of reciprocity or indebtedness. Instead, 
a more general feeling of recognition of good fortune, or ‘responsiveness to goodness’ (McAleer, 
2012), is held as morally and psychologically good and beneficial, related to awareness of general 
mutual dependency and social connection. 
 Again, once the requirement of a benefactor with agency and (benevolent) intentionality 
is dismissed, a more generalized conceptualization of gratitude, for good weather or calm seas, 
may be promoted. Positive psychology especially in the United States encourages practices of 
gratitude chronicling/journaling, positive reframing (seeing ‘silver linings’), and so on, that 
cultivate propositional gratitude (Morgan, Gulliford, & Carr, 2015; Froh et al., 2014; e.g., 
Aaronson, 2013). Yet if a dyadic, propositional/generalized conception of gratitude for society or 
aspects of life (a sunny day, an enjoyable afternoon), is combined with appreciation for the ever-
present possibility of maleficence and a focus on benefits over benefactors, this implies people 
could (should?) be grateful for good luck and social privileges and advantages, as exploitation, 
oppression, and unjust suffering are also possible challenges one can face. 
Indeed, one sees in instances of gratitude chronicling references to social privileges (e.g., 
Aaronson, 2013) which, as Morgan, Gulliford, and Carr (2015, p. 8) note, can preclude people’s 
‘appreciation of the true nature—for good or ill—of an apparent benefaction’. Such gratitude may 
aid social cohesion and psychological well-being, but remain morally problematic in relation to 
the maintenance of unjust systems and status quos (Carr, Morgan & Gulliford, 2015). 
Psychological considerations could be at odds with moral ones in such cases, if we applaud 
gratitude for being born into a wealthy family in a highly unequal society with limited social 
mobility, for example. Furthermore, it would seem that availability of things to be grateful for 
and psychological benefits could correlate with relative advantage and disadvantage, exacerbating 
rather than ameliorating conditions of social inequality. It is worth noting here that no major 
psychological study thus far has centrally involved comparisons of gratitude’s benefits in 
contexts of inequality or oppression, (quite reasonably) focusing instead usually on gratitude’s 
benefits and manifestations in relatively affluent western contexts (e.g. Lambert, Graham & 
Fincham, 2009; Froh et al., 2014; Fox et al., 2015). 
 Yet disadvantaged members of society need not be excluded from propositional gratitude, 
as others argue that one can and should have gratitude even for exploitation, abuse, and 
disadvantage! This is an extremely broad form of propositional gratitude, wherein a good is to 
found, unintended by a harming agent/sources, amidst malevolence or oppression. While Card 
(among many others, such as Berger [1975]) assume as fundamental to any moral expectation or 
ideal of gratitude that there is benevolence or a gift identifiable by a beneficiary, Fitzgerald 
contends that just about anything can be said to have a potentially positive benefit to an 
individual, from political oppression to physical abuse, arguing that (1) being harmed and (2) 
helping others are situations meriting gratitude. The source/benefactor of gratitude in a case of 
harm is not the author of the harm, but the educational benefit of the harmful event. As Fitzgerald 
contends, this kind of gratitude is: 
‘a common ideal within Buddhism. The Dalai Lama often repeats this Buddhist teaching 
by telling his audiences that he is grateful to the Chinese for giving him the opportunity to 
practice love for this enemies [and for] training in patience and helping his development 
as a person.’ (1998, p. 124)  
According to Fitzgerald, though benefits of harm are indirect and unintentional, having 
gratitude in such cases can nonetheless help to prevent (further) harm, promote or preserve 
interpersonal and communal relationships, and ‘aid in the development of virtues or help prevent 
the formation of vices’: what Fitzgerald calls ‘perfectionist reasons’ (1998, p. 130). Psychological 
studies indeed suggest that gratitude, and/or happiness derived in part from gratitude, even in 
difficult times of hardship, can lead to prosocial behavior, compassion, and altruism (Emmons & 
McCullough, 2003; Froh, Sefick, & Emmons, 2008). This framing may seem to regard gratitude 
as instrumental for personal gain or external benefits in part (Morgan, Gulliford, & Carr, 2015); 
yet such perfectionistic justifications for cultivating gratitude are commonplace, and maintain a 
moral role for gratitude in connection with enabling compassion, altruism, and future moral 
prosocial behavior (Algoe, 2012).  
Echoing Card, Fitzgerald views the capacity to maintain self-respect as essential within 
such states and/or expressions of gratitude. Fitzgerald relates three fictional women who have 
been abused by their fathers in elaborating this requirement. Dawn and Erin have inappropriate, 
misplaced gratitude, as they lack self-respect: Dawn ‘expresses gratitude by obeying [her father’s] 
abusive demands’, while Erin ‘believes that she doesn’t deserve any better’ (1998, p. 142-143). 
But Faye: 
‘thrived after she severed ties with her abusive father. She had no fear of other adversities 
in her life since they looked so small in comparison to the ones she had already survived. 
She became very compassionate because her own pain gave her insight into the suffering 
of others. She developed an unwavering passion to fight the kinds of abuse to which she 
had been subjected.’ (Fitzgerald, 1998, p. 143) 
Here the outcome reflected by propositional gratitude is not ‘responsiveness to goodness’, 
or appreciation of good fortune or interdependence, as in propositional gratitude for benevolence 
and non-maleficence. Rather, the ideal response is a kind of compassion toward others based on 
understanding that people suffer through no fault of their own, and that one is in a sense ‘lucky’ 
to have survived in a situation that is not always psychologically or physically survivable. It also 
can be seen as gratitude for relative (at least in terms of time) non-maleficence (‘things got better’; 
‘it could have been worse…’), which enables future optimism and good deeds.  Likewise, 
Fitgerald argues that helping another can create an opportunity for gratitude, as acting with 
benevolence can also help cultivate compassion, particularly in cases where a beneficiary cannot 
be morally expected to give gratitude due to his or her self-respect needs. Such gratitude for 
helping others is again said to aid self-development, even if the beneficence is not recognized as 
such, or desired by beneficiaries. 
If one were to combine the various views of gratitude presented here, in indirect causal 
chains one should be grateful for unasked-for gifts, and grateful to give people things they might 
not want, both beneficial and harmful! More problematic is a reading of Fitzgerald’s argument for 
gratitude for harm as providing justification for, or at least enabling toleration regarding harming 
people, as no harm is seen as absolute here. Fitzgerald distinguishes resentment and anger as poor 
moral alternatives to gratitude, to justify gratitude for harm, suggesting that resentment and anger 
are rarely morally helpful, in contrast with gratitude. However, McAleer argues that 
‘propositional anger’, that not directed to a person but to problems and social issues, can also 
reflect a good moral disposition aligned with propositional gratitude, as ‘being angry that so 
many people are without enough to eat expresses a sense of justice or compassion’ which can be 
likewise based on one’s appreciation of benevolence in his or her own life (2012, p. 64). In this 
way, propositional gratitude need not be seen as potentially leading to acquiescence or acceptance 
of an unjust status quo, as Fitzgerald references Faye’s fighting spirit, despite his care to not 
promote what he regards as damaging, angry feelings.   
 In sum, across philosophical and psychological literature gratitude is commonly seen as a 
good in society and relationships, which provides positive outcomes and decrease of negative, 
antisocial feelings, such as envy and resentment. The only exception is cases where one’s self-
respect might be compromised, but in this case propositional gratitude is often still seen as 
morally praiseworthy, though it is seen by some as a sub-factor of or as conceptually distinct 
from targeted gratitude in philosophy. In the next section, I examine more closely cases for 
propositional gratitude in relation to social injustice and harm. But before moving on, there are 
two interrelated issues worth addressing.  
First, some readers may fear that a feeling or emotional state emergent particularly within 
the propositional sense of gratitude cannot be taught as well as simple behaviors of gratitude 
(aligned to the targeted conception, i.e., saying thank-you). Some thinkers employ more rational, 
less affect-related framings of morality, in alignment with the ideal of justice as impartial (Callan, 
1997), and/or on the basis that liberalism entitles each to freedom over ‘private’ feelings and 
thoughts. As there is something about affect that cannot be controlled, even by oneself, some also 
suppose that such emotional education is unfeasible, unrealistic, or even akin to brainwashing 
(see for example, Meens, 2015). Relatedly, research in educational psychology may be critically 
investigated for possibly conflating taught elaboration of gratitude with teaching affective 
experiences of gratitude, as in Froh and colleagues’ (2014) study, wherein students express more 
gratitude after being educated about appraisal of benefits. In education, the relation between 
feelings, moral values, and student expressions is complicated by such structural conditions as 
educational authority in many cases.  
Nonetheless, people are indeed taught how to feel in education, and are normally taught 
by parents and educators to feel gratitude (Carr, 2015a; McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, & 
Larson, 2001; Carr, Morgan & Gulliford, 2015). As with other emotions that have moral 
connotations, such as pride, guilt, and sympathy, children are normally taught to experience or 
not experience these feelings in particular situations. An early lesson in targeted gratitude is being 
guided to say thank you, and write letters to such benefactors as grandparents for toys, or guests 
who visit class. Clearly some internalization, not just of rational duty but of affective training, 
often takes place here, as the concept may be foreign to a toddler but develop within a cultural 
context as a deeply felt personal commitment. Relatedly, one can conceive many virtuous 
qualities like courage, tolerance, or patience, as having affective dimensions that are learned at 
the same time their moral value is understood within social relations. As Carr (2015a, p. 11) 
writes, ‘emotional or other states of pride, envy, shame or guilt are not just conditions of affective 
first nature, but complex intentional states… cognitively shaped to the pursuit or satisfaction of 
humanly distinctive and definitive goals, institutions and practices’. Each student learns and feels 
distinctively; but as we do educate young people with regard to emotional development, such 
education should be explored rather than dismissed for being fuzzy or complex.  
 This perspective is bolstered by a second educational point that was briefly mentioned 
earlier. The prosocial and perfectionistic justifications which undergird much discussion of 
(particularly propositional) gratitude must also be understood as culturally bounded. As Morgan, 
Gulliford, and Carr (2015) observe, gratitude is often experienced as, or alongside different 
emotions in the United Kingdom than in the United States. From a broader perspective, as 
gratitude is tied up with particularities of social relationships and customs of gift giving—not to 
mention what counts as moral versus immoral emotional or affective expressions—one should 
avoid a simplistic endorsement of particular experiences or expressions of gratitude as a good in 
education. There is thus a sense that gratitude might be seen as a mannerism or habit that is 
culturally conditioned within particular contexts (influenced as well by subculture, religion, class, 
etc.). This is not to say that something like gratitude cannot be universal. However, at best 
gratitude can be (or is) good, as experienced and expressed within a particular moral and cultural 
context—just as is the case for other emotionally-based moral dispositions such as patience, 
compassion (Kang, 2006), or guilt, from Asia and Africa to Europe and North America (as 
examples). However, as I will go on, limitations regarding the morality of gratitude in contexts 
marked by injustice and harm still complicate the view of gratitude simply as a moral good within 
a western society. 
   
Challenges to Propositional Gratitude in Cases of Injustice and Harm 
 I previously discussed two major conceptions of gratitude. The targeted (triadic) view 
requires a benefactor with appropriate, desired good intention (or non-maleficence) toward the 
beneficiary. This has been the more traditional view in moral philosophy, wherein some identify 
gratitude as a principle of justice or as morally required or expected. In education, in home and at 
school, youth in western societies are taught to respond ‘in kind’ to receiving good things from 
others, by at least expressing thanks, if not also a sense of indebtedness or willingness or desire to 
return the favor. Psychologically such gratitude has been linked to prosocial behavior and well-
being on relational and societal levels, in synthesis with intertwined positive emotional states 
such as happiness, and decreased levels of negative and harmful emotional states such as 
depression, anxiety, and stress (Frederickson, 2004; Emmons & Mishra, 2011).  
Neither particularly problematic from moral or psychological perspectives, the 
educational implications of this view are straightforward. Educators can and should teach that it is 
customary and regarded as moral to express gratitude in such cases in culturally appropriate ways 
(by saying thank you, wishing benefactors well, etc.). This is moral for educators to do in two 
senses: first, it aligns with benefiting the students as members of society and as individuals; 
second, it is in line with relatively uncontroversial, widely-held moral values. Of course, there 
may be times when such targeted gratitude may not be a moral response: for instance, when it 
conflicts with other moral principles (one should not have gratitude if someone murders her 
sports rival, for example). But this only indicates that one should not treat gratitude as primary 
before all other moral considerations (Carr, Morgan & Gulliford, 2015). 
 There is an initial challenge to targeted gratitude to a benefactor, in relation to inequality 
and self-respect. If one lacks proper self-respect in relation to a generous benefactor gratitude 
may not be morally expected or praiseworthy as a response to a situation. A feeling of 
indebtedness can decrease positive feelings associated with gratitude, leading to guilt or 
embarrassment (Morgan, Gulliford & Kristjansson, 2014; Card, 1988). Therefore, propositional 
gratitude may be more productive psychologically and philosophically: good for the beneficiary 
and for social relations. The morality of gratitude in this case seems partly deemphasized and 
indirect here, in relation to other moral considerations, such as the need for reasonable self-
respect and self-esteem, and positive feelings of recognition of and responsiveness to goodness. 
Such a more generalized view of dyadic rather than triadic (generalized) gratitude additionally 
enables gratitude for non-maleficence in the world, a good from unknown (and known) others. 
Yet when we more fully consider the justifications for propositional gratitude in cases of 
social imbalance, injustice, harm, and inequality, a more complex picture emerges. By some of 
the accounts given for propositional gratitude (and within positive psychology reframing), one 
should have gratitude (to society or good fortune, if not to a person) for a minimum-wage job, 
instead of no job. Yet this job may come with no benefits such as health care, and might cause 
harm, for example, if a woman has a weak back and the job requires heavy lifting. Or take the 
example of a woman who is grateful to marry a man who treats her like a second-class citizen, 
but treats her better than her parents did. Or, more relevant to education, a child who is neglected 
by his or her parents, but realizes some peers fare worse. Within a broader context of social 
justice, these situations constitute harms and malevolence rather than (or as much as) 
benevolence. It is true that with propositional gratitude, these individuals can recognize that 
people suffer more than (or as) they do, and use this compassionate awareness to make a positive 
impact in the world, and meet others with an appropriately persevering spirit, like Faye. However, 
to suggest that cultivation of gratitude should be a primary response to such cases risks 
undermining intolerance toward unnecessary and immoral ongoing harm. From a psychological 
view, gratitude may always have instrumental value, but it remains morally problematic if it 
enables continuation of suffering.  
Apart from the Dalai Lama, Fitzgerald’s examples of actors with praiseworthy gratitude 
for harm are limited to cases where the harm has been concluded/halted—otherwise Fitzgerald 
considers self-respect in the situation impossible. Arguably, one should not be grateful for a 
learning experience, when he or she ought to be resisting a situation (and indeed, the latter may 
be just as educational, for moral development). Otherwise, foregrounding propositional gratitude 
over fighting injustice could imply that black Americans protesting challenges to their civil rights 
should be grateful they can hide in their homes to better avoid getting shot by police officers (see 
Puente & Cohn, 2015). Gratitude should not be expected in such a case, and encouraging 
gratitude in it could be seen as immoral to the extent that it incidentally maintains and/or implies 
toleration of oppression, disparagement of individuals and communities, or blameworthiness for 
failing to (incredibly) persevere, and see silver linings amidst oppression (Ehrenreich, 2009). 
Thus, a dark implication of propositional gratitude in situations of harm and injustice is 
not merely that it indicates servility, but that it promotes ignorance toward or a turn away from 
life’s problems and challenges. Promoting propositional gratitude to disadvantaged people of 
color in the United States, to manual laborers, people in abusive partnerships, or children in bad 
family situations may benefit the individual or people psychologically and instrumentally. Yet it 
may lead as well to denial of challenges faced, or irrational minimization of problems, when 
suggested as a coping mechanism or everyday practice across such contexts. Thus psychological 
well-being or related reflections of positive self-esteem may align with acceptance or dismissal of 
problems, as a critical, sustained focus on hardship (a fighting spirit) is framed as unhealthy, 
regardless of the moral or ethical ‘health’ of the society as a whole. From a psychological view a 
contented society may be ideal, but it may not be morally ideal if the society is unjust with many 
innocents suffering from harm and inequity. In these cases, a lack of gratitude may be a more 
moral response. This framing aligns more with McAleer’s notion of propositional anger, an 
ideally useful and productive sense of disturbance about social injustice, distinct from resentment, 
interpersonal envy, or a simple view of propositional gratitude, wherein one witnesses harms in 
the world with a spirit of intolerance rather than rationalization, aligned with compassion and care 
for others.  
A related example is given in The Bluest Eye by Toni Morrison. In the first chapter, lack 
of gratitude is defended by the main character, a young black girl named Claudia, for receiving 
what might seem in the first place to be a harmless gift of plausible value: a pink-skinned baby 
doll. Yet in Morrison’s narrative Claudia’s lack of gratitude when she is expected to have or 
express it is an act of opposition to dominant aesthetic and relational values oppressive or 
contrary to her own self-respect needs. As Claudia reflects (2007), ‘all the world had agreed that 
a blue-eyed, yellow-haired, pink-skinned doll was what every girl child treasured. “Here,” they 
said, “this is beautiful”…I could examine it to see what it was that all the world said was lovable.’ 
Claudia dissects the doll, to discover how it cries. The adults are predictably outraged: ‘“I-never-
had-a-baby-doll-in-my-whole-life…Now-you-got-one-a-beautiful-one-and-you-tear-it-up”’ (2007, 
p. 21).  
Here the value of propositional gratitude for a gift (‘better than nothing’; ‘better than what 
I had…’) is seen to risk enabling Claudia’s internalized oppression, as gratitude for what is 
valued in racist society implies in Claudia’s view acceptance or tolerance of racist beauty 
standards. It is not that Claudia is being mistreated by her family, but that loving the gift as a gift 
in a racist society conflicts with her critical attention toward racism and the social and 
psychological problems it presents for her. Sadly, as the story unfolds, Claudia’s righteous 
propositional anger (as framed by Morrison) is replaced by internalized oppression (‘I learned 
much later to worship Shirley Temple…’), and joy to have more than others in horrific 
circumstances (another girl, Pecola), in an exaggerated act of positive reframing resembling 
denial rather than psychological health. Indeed, as Morrison reveals, even gratitude for giving can 
be seen as a tool of self-righteousness and irrational grasping toward strength over others, as 
gratitude in such a case may be accompanied by a feeling of superiority, not necessarily the moral 
compassion Fitzgerald praises.  
‘All of us—all who knew [Pecola]—felt so wholesome after we cleaned ourselves on 
her…Her poverty kept us generous…We honed our egos on her, padded our characters 
with her frailty, and yawned in the fantasy of our strength. And fantasy it was, for we 
were not strong, only aggressive…not compassionate, we were polite; not good but well 
behaved. We courted death in order to call ourselves brave, and hid like thieves from life.’ 
(Morrison, 2007, pp. 205-206) 
Educating for propositional gratitude in light of harm and social injustice is another 
matter. Although propositional gratitude may be psychologically productive for individuals in 
societal conditions of imbalance and harm, in the context of formal education, the experience of 
deeply witnessing the world’s evils that such a spirit of gratitude (for relative non-maleficence) 
implies is not adequately captured by philosophers’ abstract cases, or McAleer’s simple 
description: ‘when one just appreciates the fact that so many others are not treated as they deserve 
to be treated’ (2012, p. 62). As The Bluest Eye alludes to, to educationally nurture in children 
gratitude alongside awareness of disadvantage can be psychologically and morally challenging. 
Educators who focus on teaching compassion for prosocial aims in the classroom find that young 
people do not always develop intended or hoped for affective responses to moral lessons related 
to people facing injustice and evil. As a moral or psychological defense mechanism they may 
reject or dismiss the messages via strategies of rationalization of possible feelings of guilt 
(Warren & Hytten 2004). As Warren and Hytten (2004) note, students may serve only themselves 
by focusing on luck, the bright side, and token reactions to injustice, not effectively learning 
lessons that challenge their sense of being already morally ‘complete’ or ideal.  
Furthermore, comparing oneself favorably with others in extreme cases can also be 
traumatizing to some young people, even in those cases where moral lessons are more clearly 
being learned. As Jackson (2014b; 2015) notes, educating for altruism and compassion can lead 
some students to feelings of helplessness, anxiety, and cynicism, when they broaden their views 
of those things in life that humanity cannot as a whole take for granted (as gratitude can lead to 
guilt, as mentioned previously; Carr, 2015a). Thus, in formal education it is not clear that an 
educator’s good intentions will have the desired impacts, on students as moral actors and healthy 
children and young people.   
Finally, as Carr (2015a) notes, such gratitude for general non-malevolence or good luck 
in the context of injustice and harm can be instrumentally self-serving. As Morrison describes 
Claudia and her friends, a competitive spirit can also potentially arise in positive reframing, as a 
tool of painting contrasts, alongside a sense of self-satisfaction at having more than others. Young 
people are not always seen to become good doers (in impact or intent) by cultivating gratitude or 
compassion, caring, or altruism, despite the view that these are good, valuable affective 
dispositions to develop (Nussbaum, 2001). They may alternatively develop an unbalanced sense 
of compassion, toward peers similar to themselves, rather than those who suffer more serious 
tragedy (Nussbaum, 2001). Their responses and efforts toward enhancing social justice may be 
tainted with an unconscious sense of superiority, paternalism, and/or ethnocentrism, if they focus 
only on relative advantage and its (so-called) blessings, developing a view of others as deficient 
which is oversimplified and reinscribes inequitable relations and attitudes (Jackson, 2014a). I can 
be grateful to have a good job, and reflect from this gratitude, to improve life for others, helping 
job seekers and underemployed colleagues. But my gratitude hardly leads to the latter—I can also 
be grateful without giving back, or caring, to benefit myself more than others.  
 In sum, though Fitzgerald (among others) emphasizes resentment and anger regarding 
injustice as harmful, promoting gratitude in such cases by drawing a line between learning from 
harm (with self-respect) and tolerating wrongdoing (without self-respect), this line is harder to 
draw in real-life cases. Propositional anger as described by McAleer may be worthwhile in many 
instances, not only in rare, extraordinary cases. On the other hand, potentially precluding people’s 
deliberation about societal ills, outrageous, horrifying, and angering, for the sake of cultivating 
gratitude can be wrong-headed, as injustice is sadly an everyday part of life for many people: not 
a rare, theoretically problematic exception. One might object that even in extreme cases in 
psychological literature the promotion and development of feelings of gratitude and forgiveness 
can be beneficial. One should not stew in resentment and anger, which can be unproductive and 
unhealthy; at the same time that one has anger he or she may also grow from the challenge of 
trying to be grateful things are not worse, or have gotten better. Yet if this stance is accepted in 
such a way as to preclude moral focus, questions, and deliberation about social problems faced by 
disadvantaged groups, it can be seen alternatively as paternalistic and as a type of dismissal or 
tolerance toward moral wrongdoing in the world. To the extent that promoting gratitude could 
enable joyful ignorance of life’s challenges, it should not be held as always ideal or praiseworthy 
relative to lack of gratitude. Intolerance of injustice and related lack of gratitude can be morally 
praiseworthy in some such cases in relation to self-respect needs, and should not be dismissed 
due to a priori status of psychological interests. 
 
Gratitude in Education 
 Jonas (2012) argues that educators must teach against resentment and for gratitude. As he 
elaborates (2012, p. 43), ‘We have come to assume that anger and resentment are necessary for 
justice to be done. This is not the case, however. In the same way that Martin Luther King Jr. and 
Gandhi were able to rectify injustices without violence, so are individuals able…without anger 
and resentment’. Relatedly, he argues that educators must avoid enabling students to think 
comparatively in social justice education, about privilege and disadvantage, lest half the students 
develop resentment in place of gratitude, when they witness the pleasure of easy gratitude in their 
peers. Froh and colleagues (2009) similarly articulate the potential for gratitude to increase 
satisfaction of youth in schools, to enhance social bonds and particularly to decrease adolescent 
unhappiness in education. There is always something we can be grateful for, as philosophers and 
psychologists attest, as one reflects on the potential and actual harms people face in the world, 
and one’s relatively good position, through gratitude reframing or other habits of developing 
gratitude.  
But what if encouragement of gratitude leads to ignorance of life’s challenges, or joy to 
have more than others? Though positive psychology asserts that gratitude can lead to being more 
beneficent in the world around you, without critical interrogation of how social injustice operates 
as individual advantage and disadvantage, one can be led away from understanding its structural 
nature, in favor of pleasure seeking and naivety, through gratitude chronicling, or random acts of 
generosity to others. Such may benefit the individual, but possibly at the cost of a more just 
community, particularly if one is lulled into relative inaction (or highly partial action), given the 
ease of gratitude reframing in contrast with the complexity of injustice in the world. If one is 
asked only to reflect on what is good in his or her own life, using understanding of injustice 
instrumentally to benefit oneself (or even oneself, as well as others around him or her), indirectly 
the lesson may be learned that identifying moral and ethical problems and challenges is immoral 
or unbeneficial (or less moral/beneficial), in contrast to psychological self-cultivation. If one sees 
him or herself as benefiting from good things in the world without also considering how he or her 
or others are suffering unjustly, an easy sense of self-satisfaction and complacency may arise. 
Thus there is a possibility that gratitude reframing or other activities in the classroom for 
gratitude could preclude a critical understanding of societal ills and one’s position, active or 
passive, in relation to them. Students could learn that they are better off than youth in Syria today, 
without grappling with the challenges faced or developing an effectively compassionate or 
altruistic spirit.  
Furthermore, despite the framings by Fitzgerald (1998) and Jonas (2012) particularly, 
resentment and ingratitude or lack of gratitude should not be conflated as a matter of course. 
Propositional gratitude can be accompanied by propositional anger, as McAleer notes. Martin 
Luther King Jr. was not always happy, gracious, and emphatically grateful. He also justified the 
violent riots of African Americans in the 1960s civil rights movement as a reasonable reaction to 
denial of their challenges and their inhumane treatment in a society which reflected a legacy of 
white supremacist laws and practices (King, 1963). Students might thus learn of propositional 
anger as well as propositional gratitude in this context: that outrage at injustice can be morally 
expressed, as well as appreciation for good fortunes or for things getting better. Repressing such 
mixed feelings at a personal or societal level can be morally as well as psychologically 
problematic, even if concerns may remain that resentment or feelings of rage can be risky and 
harmful.  
Relatedly, the emphasis on gratitude in education has paternalistic overtones, as those in 
authority risk expressing through gratitude moralism that they know more than others do about 
what is best for them. As misplaced gratitude can harm self-respect, educators cannot know when 
whole-hearted expressions of gratitude are warranted for students, as they do not necessarily 
know a great deal about their lives beyond the school walls. Given educator authority, students 
may feel obliged to express appreciation or tolerance in relation to potential harms they face to a 
degree that may neglect their self-respect needs, if gratitude is treated as a primary moral or 
psychological priority above others, rather than as a potentially praiseworthy if psychologically 
difficult position to take in some situations. More generally, teachers promoting gratitude across 
diverse scenarios and contexts may suggest unwittingly to students that a condition of servility is 
warranted among disadvantaged groups, and a focus on social problems (and their resolutions) 
and social demands for justice is morally distasteful or psychologically unhealthy. If gratitude 
reframing for propositional gratitude is employed, so too should identification of social injustice 
that may enable propositional anger, for social ills from obscure sources that harm individuals 
and groups.  
Such considerations should encourage educators and others to reflect more critically on 
the morality of judging others’ gratitude or lack thereof, such as in diverse classroom settings. In 
regarding gratitude as a generally good thing for students to have, an educator can send a message 
to students that their particular challenges in life are not important, without knowing what those 
challenges are, by treating all students as if they are the same. In the area of affective education, 
educators cannot fully determine their impact in advance, or presume that a student’s apparent 
lack of gratitude is based on life experiences known by the educator. One student may be 
brooding for being punished for wrongdoing, while another may be facing abuse at home. In this 
context, students’ mixed response to a celebration of family and parents in the classroom should 
not be dismissed as immoral ingratitude. Children can face challenges and compromises to their 
self-respect and development (as all people do…) that may imply limitations to their capacity for 
self-respecting gratitude. In a world where social injustice is rife in everyday inequality and 
inequity across race, class, gender, and other categories of social difference, there are certainly 
worse moral crimes than lack of gratitude, even within instances where gratitude may also 
conceivably be beneficial.  
As Morgan, Gulliford and Carr (2015) note, in place of simplistic endorsements of 
gratitude and positive reframing, a more critical focus on teaching for and about gratitude could 
help students to understand nuances and complexities in age-appropriate real-life situations, to 
“appreciate the complex grammar of gratitude discourse” in a morally complex world (p. 12). As 
an alternative to teaching simply to cultivate gratitude or appreciation generally, teachers can 
facilitate students consideration of whether and how gratitude may or may not be warranted in 
cases marked by deceptive or self-interested ‘beneficence’, for instance, and how in some cases 
expecting gratitude may be unreasonable even if it is ideal, when people are facing hardships. 
Instead of teaching gratitude moralism, educators should question with students when and how 
gratitude can be good or bad, based on morally relevant features of the situation, such as whether 
one exhibits acceptance or inaction regarding unjust privilege, versus directing that gratitude and 
benefit toward making life better for less advantaged people. Students can also consider historical 
stories—for example, the case of German Christian rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust (see 
for example Oliner et al., 1992; also Fox et al., 2015)—to analyze how gratitude can be used for 
the good of others, rather than only for oneself. Such nuanced examples can frame cultivation of 
gratitude not as an a priori goal for life, but as one amongst many others in one’s path to be 
morally good and psychological happy in a complex and unjust world.  
In sum, despite the pleas of philosophers, educators, and psychologists who embrace 
gratitude in diverse situations, a lack of gratitude should not be simply regarded in classroom 
contexts as immoral and gratitude as always required, expected, or praiseworthy. Though in 
diverse cases there may be reasons to continue to strive toward gratitude, precluding 
opportunities to reflect on the possible moral reasons for a lack of gratitude in some instances can 
risk students failing to recognize the needs of people for self-respect and respect for others and 
their ethical duties toward others in unjust circumstances. When it comes to gratitude, discussing 
moral decision making reflectively and critically with students, rather than emphasizing moral 
principles or psychological priorities of gratitude as absolute or required, can encourage a more 
effective moral education toward social justice in everyday life. Students in such contexts can 
learn that gratitude can be difficult and praiseworthy to strive toward in some instances and that 
lack of gratitude is not always morally problematic across diverse cases, while also learning of 
gratitude’s merits and value from different philosophical and societal perspectives. 
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